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Against Ethnicity: Democracy, Equality, and the Northern Irish Conflict 
 
Introduction 
In a pioneering book on the start of the Troubles, Niall Ó Dochartaigh argues that the 
"outbreak of conflict in Yugoslavia" made it "much more widely acceptable to analyse the 
situation in Northern Ireland as an ethnic conflict." The Troubles looked "like a vision of a 
common European future."1 By the end of the twentieth century, ethnic approaches to 
understanding conflict had become intellectual common sense.2 Far from being a statement of 
the obvious, though, describing twenty-first-century conflict in ethnic terms was clearly 
becoming a distortion of reality. The era of ethnic pandemonium predicted by some 
commentators after the fall of the Berlin wall did not arrive.3 In fact, the number of civil wars 
taking place around the world has fallen into steep decline. The Cold War had not contained 
internal conflicts but had instead encouraged them: these years had seen a steady increase in 
ongoing civil wars. When superpower support ended, outbreaks of civil wars went down and 
terminations of civil wars went up.4 The armed conflicts in what had been Yugoslavia came 
                                                          
1 Niall Ó Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish 
Troubles (Basingstoke, 2005 edn.), 8. 
2 Richard Bourke, "Languages of Conflict and the Northern Ireland Troubles," Journal of 
Modern History 83, no. 3 (September 2011): 544-78, at 545. 
3 Daniel Moynihan, Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (New York, 1993). 
4 Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: 
How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," American Political Science Review 
104, no. 3 (August 2010): 415-29. 
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to a close themselves at the start of the century, with a non-violent revolution -- an ending 
that calls into question whether the story should still be read as an ethnic tragedy.5 
Before Slobodan Milošević was toppled, scholars from a range of disciplines -- 
among others, the historian Richard Bourke, the political scientist Stathis Kalyvas, and the 
sociologist Rogers Brubaker -- had already begun to tear down ethnic interpretations of 
internal conflict. Inspiration was often taken from the academic arguments that had brought 
about "the fall of class" a decade or so earlier.6 Just as ethnicity takes center stage in studies 
of twentieth-century Ireland, class used to be the actor around which the drama of nineteenth-
century Britain was written.7 In his essay "Rethinking Chartism," Gareth Stedman Jones 
sought to escape "the gravitational pull exercised by the social interpretation." Starting "from 
what Chartists actually said or wrote" rather than with the concept of class consciousness, he 
                                                          
5 V. P. Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (London, 2004), 2, 
7, and 178; Ivan Rejvoda, "Civil Society versus Slobodan Milošević: Serbia, 1991-2000," in 
Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to 
the Present, eds. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (Oxford, 2011), 295-316. 
6 Richard Bourke, Peace in Ireland: The War of Ideas (London, 2003); Bourke. "Languages 
of Conflict"; Stathis Kalyvas, "The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in 
Civil Wars," Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (September 2003): 475-94; Stathis Kalyvas, 
The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, 2006); Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without 
Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no 2 (August 2002): 163-89; Stathis Kalyvas, 
"Conflict," in The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology, eds. Peter Hedström and Peter 
Berman (Oxford, 2009), 592-615. 
7 Patrick Joyce, Democratic Subjects: The Self and the Social in Nineteenth-Century England 
(Cambridge, 1994), 2 and 4. 
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took their preoccupation with politics seriously.8 With this essay, Stedman Jones spearheaded 
a return to politics. Political ideas and institutions were no longer seen as spume on the wave 
of social and economic realities.9 The political is a distinct sphere of human activity where 
the terms of the life in common are debated, laid down, and contested. It is made up of 
interrelated sites, which range from street protests in a neighborhood to strategies played out 
in a formal international organization. Action presupposes thought. So, political struggle has 
to be studied in its intellectual context if individuals are to be credited with having agency.10 
For Bourke, the Troubles was a contest "over the meaning of popular sovereignty."11 
Most scholars of modern Ireland, however, still examine the past through the ethnic lens. 
This may be because they cannot actually see that the ground has gone from beneath them. 
"Theory-induced blindness," as the psychologist Daniel Kahneman calls it, sets in once a 
                                                          
8 Gareth Stedman Jones, "Rethinking Chartism," in Languages of Class: Studies in English 
Working Class History, ed. Gareth Stedman Jones (Cambridge, 1983), 90-178, at 94 and 106. 
9 James Thompson, "After the Fall: Class and Political Language in Britain, 1780-1900," 
Historical Journal 39, no. 3 (September 1996): 785-806, at 795. 
10 Susan Pedersen, "What Is Political History Now?" in What Is History Now? ed. David 
Cannadine (Basingstoke, 2002); Jon Lawrence, "Political History," in Writing History: 
Theory and Practice eds. Stefan Berger, Heiko Feldner and Kevin Passmore (London, 2003), 
183-202; David Craig and James Thompson, "Introduction," in Languages of Politics in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain, eds. David Craig and James Thompson (Basingstoke, 2013), 1-
20; William Novak. "Beyond Max Weber: The Need for a Democratic (Not Aristocratic) 
Theory of the Modern State," Tocqueville Review 36, no. 1 (2015): 43-91. 
11 Bourke, "Languages of Conflict," 550 and 578. 
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theory has been widely accepted and found to be a useful tool for reasoning.12 So, on the rare 
occasions they get cited, Bourke's Peace in Ireland is usually misrepresented as a general 
history of the Troubles and Kalyvas's research tends to be applied selectively.13 Doubting is 
harder work than believing.14 Scholars will not quickly and easily put down the old tools 
which have served them so well. This article will therefore not set out to prove that the 
ethnic-conflict interpretation is "false" and that the model based on the problems of giving 
practical expression to the principle of democratic sovereignty is "true." It will instead 
attempt to show that the former set of tools is unwieldy and that the latter set is much more 
effective and delivers far better results.15 
This article is divided into four main sections. The first of these highlights the flaws in 
general theories of ethnicity as they relate to internal conflict and political violence. The 
second section goes on to offer brief critiques of the bespoke interpretations of violent 
conflict in modern Ireland put together by Tim Wilson and by the sociologist Joseph Ruane 
and the political scientist Jennifer Todd. Wilson's model, it should be noted, is built out of his 
research on Ulster between 1918 and 1922, but he nonetheless makes clear that he thinks it 
                                                          
12 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (London, 2011), 277. 
13 Geoffrey Warner, "Putting Pressure on O'Neill: The Wilson Government and Northern 
Ireland 1964-9," Irish Studies Review 13, no. 1 (February 2005): 13-31, at 13; Cheryl 
Lawther, Truth, Denial and Transition: Northern Ireland and the Contested Past (Abingdon, 
2014), 29; Gemma Clark, Everyday Violence in the Irish Civil War (Cambridge, 2014), 2, 
154, 181, 184, and 195. 
14 Daniel Gilbert, "How Mental Systems Believe," American Psychologist 46, no. 2 (February 
1991): 107-19. 
15 Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 288 and 314. 
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applies to the Troubles, too.16 The first two sections focus firmly upon ethnicity; however, the 
basic criticisms also hold for other terms associated with nationalism such as race, sect, and 
culture. Applying these terms to internal conflicts and acts of violence produces descriptions, 
not explanations. They can account for neither individual behavior nor collective action. 
Ethnic, racial, sectarian, and cultural groups are all abstractions. The third section moves on 
to the new political approach. Drawing on the work of intellectual historians from the 
Cambridge School, this section sets out a very short history of the idea of modern democracy 
and it examines the concept's capacity for creating conflict. The final section uses previously 
unseen and overlooked archival sources to show how the new set of tools comes much closer 
than the old one to capturing the complexities, contradictions, and ambiguities of conflict and 
violence in Belfast at the start of the Troubles. It begins by detailing how the parties to the 
overarching conflict were mobilized by rival understandings of democratic legitimacy. In this 
way, modern democracy brought a degree of consensus to the divided politics of Northern 
Ireland because the parties put the same ideas and language to use. The section concludes by 
exploring other violent incidents from this time and place. Where ethnic interpretations class 
such acts as either ethnic or criminal, this article argues that they should instead be seen as 
conjunctions of the political and the private. 
 
Ethnicity Is What? 
By the time the first major academic accounts of the early Troubles appeared at the turn of 
the century, their authors had already come to assume that the concept of ethnicity was so 
                                                          
16 T. K. Wilson, Frontiers of Violence: Conflict and Identity in Ulster and Upper Silesia, 
1918-1922 (Oxford, 2010), 215-6 and 219-20; Tim Wilson, "Frank Wright Revisited," Irish 
Political Studies 26, no. 3 (August 2011): 277-82. 
6 
 
widely known that their readers did not need to have it defined.17 But, the lack of a definition 
matters here. Causal claims which tie together properties related to ethnic identity with, say, 
violence cannot be taken as reasonable ones until it can be shown that these properties are 
linked uniquely or even disproportionately with ethnicity. "We cannot," the political scientist 
Kanchan Chandra points out, "talk about what ethnicity does unless we first address the 
question of what ethnic identity is."18 However, this proves a surprisingly difficult first step 
to take. 
Some scholars of modern Ireland have chosen to adopt the definition worked out by 
the political scientist Donald Horowitz.19 In his "seminal text," Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 
Horowitz holds that "Ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry."20 This definition, 
though, does not even match the classification used in the book in which it appears. Hindus 
                                                          
17 Ó Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to Armalites, 7; Marc Mulholland, Northern Ireland at 
the Crossroads: Ulster Unionism in the O’Neill Years, 1960-9 (London, 2000), ix; Thomas 
Hennessey, Northern Ireland: The Origins of the Troubles (Dublin, 2005), 388. 
18 Kanchan Chandra, "What Is Ethnic Identity? A Minimalist Definition," in Constructivist 
Theories of Ethnic Politics, ed. Kanchan Chandra (Oxford, 2012), 51-96 at 52. 
19 Ó Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to Armalites, 8 and 10; Peter McLoughlin, "Horowitz's 
Theory of Ethnic Party Competition and the Case of the Northern Ireland Social Democratic 
and Labour Party, 1970-79," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 14, no. 4 (November 2008): 
549-78; John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding 
Northern Ireland (London, 1993). 
20 Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict," in The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Politics and Ethnic Groups, eds. Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (Oxford, 2007), 
274-94 at 274; Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA, 1985), 52. 
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and Muslims in India, Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, and Creoles and Indians in 
Guyana and Trinidad do not have a myth of common ancestry, yet Horowitz classes them all 
as ethnic categories. Admittedly, "Catholics" and "Protestants" in modern Ireland can be said 
to possess such myths. But, for a myth of common ancestry to be the primary defining 
characteristic of an ethnic group, the successful reception of this myth could not rest upon 
any other characteristic that also distinguishes members. Common ancestry is, of course, a 
meaningless way of defining group membership.21 Dramatically narrowing the focus does not 
make it into a definition which works, as even members of a nuclear family can be classed as 
belonging to different ethnic groups. A myth of common ancestry is not troubled by such 
problematic facts. However, while myths are made not born, they are present at their making 
-- constructed out of the materials to hand. Some criterion external and prior to the myth is 
also needed as a guide to which of these ingredients should be stirred into the story.22 
Any proposed definition based on a common culture again fails to capture the way 
ethnic groups are typically classified. Once more, however, the definition does seem to work 
for "Catholics" and "Protestants." "The seminal text here," writes Wilson, "is Fredrik Barth's 
introduction to...Ethnic Groups and Boundaries."23 Barth argues that "cultural features" are 
employed as "signals and emblems of differences," creating and maintaining boundaries that 
                                                          
21 Chandra, "What Is Ethnic Identity?" 77-80; Peter Ralph and Graham Coop, "The 
Geography of Recent Genetic Ancestry across Europe," PLoS Biol 11, no. 5 (May 2013): 
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001555 (last accessed 21 April 2016). 
22 Guy Beiner, "Probing the Boundaries of Irish Memory: from Postmemory to Prememory 
and back," Irish Historical Studies 39, no. 154 (November 2014): 296-307. 
23 Wilson, Frontiers of Violence, 14. 
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incorporate and shut out.24 But, such cultural features can rarely serve as the primary defining 
characteristics; they generally need to be backed up by descent-based attributes. Indeed, 
Barth's own post-war case study of the "Pathans" suggests that this identity could not be 
constituted simply on the basis of "act[ing] out core Pathan values." "The acceptance of a 
strict patrilineal descent criterion," he concedes, "is universal."25 Parentage was key in 
Ireland, too, during the twentieth century. The Ne Temere decree issued by the Roman Curia 
in 1907 required the children of mixed marriages to be raised as Roman Catholics.26 Baptized 
Protestants who converted to Roman Catholicism and took up the Irish nationalist cause were 
not accepted on the other side of the boundary, even though they were performing the core 
values.27 Descent counts more than culture.28 
Chandra argues that ethnic identities belong to a wider set of "categories in which 
descent-based attributes are necessary for membership."29 As ethnic identities are defined 
only by the "attribute-descent rule" for membership, an individual does not have a single, 
                                                          
24 Frederik Barth, "Introduction," in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization 
of Culture Difference, ed. Frederik Barth (Long Grove, IL, 1998 edn.), 9-38, at 14 and 15 
(emphasis in original). 
25 Frederik Barth, "Pathan Identity and Its Maintenance," in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, 
117-34, at 117, 119 and 123. 
26 Marianne Elliott, When God Took Sides: Religion and Identity in Ireland - Unfinished 
History (Oxford, 2009), 138 and 229. 
27 See, for instance, attitudes towards James Scott, the founder of National Unity. Michael 
McKeown, The Greening of a Nationalist (Lucan, 1986), 17-20. 
28 Chandra, "What Is Ethnic Identity?" 85-7. 
29 Kanchan Chandra, "Introduction," in Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics, 1-47, at 9. 
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fixed ethnic identity. Everyone has a range of nominal ethnic identities, those categories in 
which an individual qualifies for membership due to the attributes s/he has. Ethnic identities 
are activated when an individual claims membership in a category or when s/he is placed into 
one by others. Chandra divides descent-based attributes broadly into three types: those to do 
with genetics such as skin color; those which come through cultural inheritance such as the 
religion of parents and earlier generations; and those which are acquired as markers of that 
heritage such as schooling. A set of rules is also required to separate out ethnic categories 
from other descent-based ones a. Ethnic categories need to be large enough for membership 
to be impersonal, so as to distinguish them from family. They have to make up just a part of a 
country's population. If one sibling is eligible for membership at any given place, then all the 
other siblings must be as well. The qualifying attributes for membership have to be limited to 
physical features and/or to the religion, sect, language, dialect, tribe, clan, race, nationality, 
region, and caste of parents and ancestors. As Chandra acknowledges, these rules are 
arbitrary. They are simply required so as to have her definition match the standard 
classification and make it possible to determine what properties can and cannot reasonably be 
related to the concept of ethnicity. Afterwards, scholars can choose to discard them -- along 
with, possibly, ethnicity itself.30 
Chandra picks out two properties intrinsically associated with an ethnic category: 
constrained change and visibility. Ethnic identities can change, even in the short term, yet 
only within the limits imposed by fixed sets of descent-based attributes. A practiced observer 
should be able to tell which key attributes an individual has. However, such observers will 
not always interpret the categories that these attributes identify in the same way. An identical 
skin-color shade will be read as "black" in the United States -- where there is a polar system 
                                                          
30 Chandra, "What Is Ethnic Identity?" 58-63. 
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of categorization -- but as "brown" in Brazil -- which has a system of categorization based on 
a color continuum.31 Interpretations can also change over time. Brazilian census results show 
a sizeable shift since the 1960s from the categories of Blanco ("white") and Preto ("black") to 
Pardo ("brown"), in large part because people revised the way they identified themselves.32 
Categories are constructed, re-constructed, and discarded -- a process that is bottom up as 
well as a top down. 
Most scholars working on how ethnic groups are formed accept basic constructivist 
assumptions: individuals have multiple identities, which can change, as the result of historical 
developments. Nonetheless, most of those researching the effects of ethnicity upon politics 
have yet to apply these insights. Arguments to do with democratic instability and with violent 
conflict end up resting upon ethnic identities having to be fixed. Democracy, goes the typical 
line of reasoning, has to have fluid majorities and minorities if the system is to sustain 
people's support. Societies divided along ethnic lines generally produce "permanent" 
majorities and minorities, undermining people's support for the system as a whole and 
encouraging some of them to step outside its rules.33 The existing literature tends to see such 
competition and antipathy between ethnic groups as bringing with it the threat of violent 
conflict. Marc Mulholland, for instance, maintains that the Troubles was a "continuation, and 
                                                          
31 Kanchan Chandra, "Attributes and Categories: A New Conceptual Vocabulary 
For Thinking About Ethnic Identity," in Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics, 97-131. 
32 Melissa Nobles, "History Counts: A Comparative Analysis of Racial/Color Categorization 
in US and Brazilian Censuses," American Journal of Public Health 90, no. 11 (November 
2000): 1738-45; Livio Sansome, Blackness without Ethnicity: Constructing Race in Brazil 
(Basingstoke, 2003), 1-59. 
33 Chandra, "Introduction," 38-9. 
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intensification, of the communal struggle."34 Ethnic identities during a violent conflict are 
taken as being fixed, automatically salient, and what determines political behavior. 
Individuals, writes Kalyvas in summary of this position, "will act in support of organizations 
claiming to represent their ethnic identity -- so much so that individuals and organizations can 
be conflated into a single actor, the 'ethnic group'."35 The result is to drain politics from 
political violence. 
Fixity is the property on which these two models depend, but it cannot by definition 
be intrinsically associated with an ethnic category. Ethnic readings of the Troubles either 
overlook or sidestep this issue. The political scientists John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary 
argue that ethnic identities are durable -- which means they can be treated as if they were 
fixed.36 If they are durable, then this is a puzzle which needs to be solved rather than a fact 
which can be taken for granted. The answer offered by the anthropologist John Nagle and the 
political scientist Mary-Alice Clancy is that "Conflict hardens identities."37 Yet 
constructivism's viability as a theory requires identities to be capable of softening, hardening, 
and remaining unchanged.38 So, constructivists in principle end up as primordialists in 
practice. 
                                                          
34 Mulholland, Northern Ireland at the Crossroads, 164. 
35 Stathis Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection in Civil War," Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 8 
(August 2008): 1043-68, at 1043. 
36 John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, 
and its Agreement 2," Government and Opposition 41, no. 2 (March 2006): 249-77, at 271. 
37 John Nagle and Mary-Alice Clancy, Shared Society or Benign Apartheid? Understanding 
Peace-Building in Divided Societies (Basingstoke, 2010), 15. 
38 Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection in Civil War," 1046. 
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A second way of defining the term primordial is to focus on attachments. "One is 
bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer," writes the anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz. These "primordial bonds" "seem to flow more from a sense of natural -- 
some would say spiritual -- affinity than from social interaction." As a "primordially-based 
'corporate feeling of oneness' [is for many] the meaning of the term 'self' in 'self-rule,'" Geertz 
argues that "a sovereign civil state" brings with it the risk of "communal uproars."39 McGarry 
and O'Leary are primordialists in this second sense. The pair's ethno-national communities 
are so strong and long-lasting because they are based on the "givenness" of kinship bonds.40 
Political conflict, however, cannot be ripped out from its intellectual context.41 People 
consciously construct political ties out of normative principles and modify them under the 
pressures of the political process. Collective action requires political organizations and 
ideologies.42 Ethnic conflict therefore cannot reasonably be distinguished from political 
conflict. Indeed, during the course of the Troubles, individuals who supposedly possessed the 
same ethnic identity/ties did not behave in the same ways. Some "Catholics" joined the 
security forces and some "Protestants" campaigned and, on occasion, fought for a united 
Ireland. Individuals could even change sides: a small minority of Provisional IRA volunteers 
                                                          
39 Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in 
the New States," in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, ed. Clifford Geertz (New 
York, 1973), 255-310, at 259, 260, and 270. 
40 John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Explaining Conflict in Northern Ireland: Broken 
Images (Oxford, 1995), 354-5. 
41 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Volume I: Regarding Method (Cambridge, 2002), xi. 
42 Bourke, "Languages of Conflict," 549-50 and 563-5. 
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became British spies and informers.43 Such "defections" matter even though the low numbers 
involved would at first suggest otherwise. Human beings are not fully rational, so the fear of 
"defection" was not proportional to the probability of the threat.44 The Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) targeted for death or assault hundreds of people from the community 
that it claimed to be defending.45 This "Catholic"-on-"Catholic" violence undermines the 
argument that so many different individuals and organizations can be treated as if they were a 
unitary actor.46 The number of "defections," moreover, may have in fact been higher -- much 
higher. The political scientist Kevin Bean contends that from the late 1980s onwards twisted 
policy paths created the political space for the Provisional Republican movement to work 
with the British state. Pro-Agreement Republicans did not become "Protestants," yet they still 
gave up in practice their claim to be the legitimate rulers of the island and went into coalition 
with unionists to govern part of the United Kingdom. 47 Political ideas and institutions should 
no longer be seen as spume on the wave of ethnic realities. 
 
Home-Grown Theories of Ethnic Conflict 
                                                          
43 Thomas Leahy, "The Influence of Informers and Agents on Provisional IRA Military 
Strategy and British Counter-Insurgency Strategy, 1976-94," Twentieth Century British 
History 26, no. 1 (March 2015): 122-146. 
44 Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 316. 
45 Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (Basingstoke, 2004 edn.), 361 
and 388. 
46 Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection in Civil War," 1050. 
47 Kevin Bean, The New Politics of Sinn Féin (Liverpool, 2007). 
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Neither Wilson nor Ruane and Todd simply apply existing models about the effects of 
ethnicity. Instead, they have drawn on general theories to develop arguments for a particular 
time and place. Wilson's "starting point" is that Ulster society from the seventeenth century 
onwards was divided between "two clearly-defined communities." When their struggle to 
dominate each other turned violent -- which it did every decade or so -- killers selected 
victims as "representatives of their community, not as individuals." Everyone could be 
identified as belonging to one of the two ethnic groups; everyone was a potential victim; 
everyone had a reason to be afraid. The tit-for-tat cycles of representative violence had by the 
end of the nineteenth century led to the emergence of "deterrence communities." Periods of 
peace were simply cold wars. However, "the trouble with deterrence threats," as Wilson 
explains, "is that sooner or later they have to be acted upon." Each side in these violent 
conflicts was seeking to force the other one to back down by inflicting unbearable levels of 
suffering and by showing it could take the pain.48 
Wilson concludes that "conflict on the ethnic frontier" operated "essentially like a 
large-scale system of feud."49 This point is not developed much further, so it helps to read 
Frontiers of Violence alongside the sociologist Roger Gould's work on violence in American 
cities and on Corsica. Between 1980 and 2008, strangers were to blame for only 22 percent of 
homicides in the United States for which the victim/offender relationships were known.50 
Most murders involve lovers, family members, friends, acquaintances, or neighbors. Motives 
                                                          
48 Wilson, Frontiers of Violence, 196-220. 
49 Ibid., 215. 
50 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the United 
States, 1980-2008, by Alexia Cooper and Erica Smith, Open-file report NCJ 236018 
(Washington, D.C., 2011). http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf 
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for a very large proportion of these killings seem to be trivial matters. Gould sees in these 
facts signs that "interpersonal violence [is] a product of social relations." Intimacy necessarily 
entails frequent contact between individuals and these interactions end up generating 
informal hierarchies. Though informal, these hierarchies are not insignificant -- as is shown 
by the value that humans have placed on honor, respect, and popularity. Conflict arises when 
an existing hierarchy is challenged; competition over social status tends to happen when 
people think the rankings have become unclear. Gould holds that groups relate to each other 
in much the same way as individuals do. During times of political instability, some groups 
view the resulting disruption to social relations as a ladder to a higher ranking.51 Such a 
pattern appears to apply to Northern Ireland, where -- as Wilson points out -- the Irish 
Revolution, the labor militancy of the mid-1930s, and the civil rights movement all coincided 
with serious rioting.52 
Drawing parallels with feuding societies, however, also draws attention to a flaw in 
Wilson's reasoning. There is more rather than less interpersonal violence in these societies, 
even though individuals know that this carries the risk of sparking collective violence. Gould 
believes this is because people also have individual interests that set them apart from fellow 
group members and that they set above the common good.53 While Wilson does recognize 
that "personal feelings of hatred and revenge" play a part in "grassroots violence," he 
nonetheless minimizes their importance. Between these base emotions and the "political 
stratosphere" lies, according to Wilson, the much larger space of ethnic struggle. He insists 
                                                          
51 Roger Gould, Collision of Wills: How Ambiguity about Social Rank Breeds Conflict 
(London, 2003), 4, 17, 66, and 86. 
52 Wilson, Frontiers of Violence, 215. 
53 Gould, Collision of Wills, 116, and 118. 
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that "any member of an opposing community will do as a victim."54 Indeed, the concept of 
ethnic conflict can only make sense if group members could have been switched for each 
other. On those occasions when victims were targeted for motives that went beyond group 
attributes in any way -- a low threshold to meet -- the violence cannot then be classed as 
simply ethnic.55 
Individual interests pose internal obstacles to group unity as well. Bourke, though, is 
the only scholar working on the conflict in modern Ireland to even reference Mancur Olson, 
the economist who formalized the "collective action problem."56 Put simply, the problem is 
that "rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests."57 Explaining the outbreaks of collective violence on the streets of Belfast requires 
this problem to be either resolved or reformulated. Wilson's answer is polarization. Everyone 
living in the northeast of Ireland clustered around one of two distant poles; in times of rising 
tension, people were pulled closer together in groups and groups were pushed further apart. 
For self-interested individuals, the rational choice here was to seek their own personal 
security through collective action. As a result, writes Wilson, "party politics faithfully 
reflected communal polarization" and each community "entertained a strong sense of 
ownership over its 'defenders'." Whenever this cold war turned hot, the violence "jump[ed] 
                                                          
54 Wilson, Frontiers of Violence, 206 and 220. 
55 Kalyvas, "Ontology of 'Political Violence'," 481. 
56 Richard Bourke, "Antigone and After: 'Ethnic' Conflict in Historical Perspective," Field 
Day Review 2 (2006): 168-94, at 180; Bourke, "Languages of Conflict," 565. 
57 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, MA, 1971 edn.), 2. 
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back and forth between the poles of rival communities."58 Although polarization provides a 
plausible explanation, it is open to a number of challenges. Drawing upon evidence from the 
early Troubles, Bourke demonstrates that "hostility was an effect of conflict rather than its 
cause."59 And in societies where there are high levels of division, research suggests that this 
has not significantly increased the likelihood of violent conflict.60 Moreover, polarization 
does not appear to be simply black and white: there is always a swathe of gray between the 
two poles where the majority of people cluster. Individual and group interests will only ever 
be tightly aligned for a small minority. There is wide variation, too, in the emotions the same 
situation can elicit. Furthermore, people will not respond to identical emotions in identical 
ways.61 Anyway, as Bourke underlines, "common feeling is not sufficient to unite individual 
wills into a coherent plan of action."62 
The concept of polarization owes much to the ideas of Carl Schmitt. Wilson alludes to 
the philosopher's famous dictum when he argues that "security depended upon enforcing 
clear-cut distinctions between friends and enemies." The friend-enemy distinction, according 
to Schmitt, "denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or a separation": the 
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willingness to die for the group and to kill members of the other group. All political actions 
and motives can be reduced to this ultimate distinction. Wilson comes very close to endorsing 
this position, not least in his statement that "To know the communal identity of the victim 
was to know the communal identity of the perpetrator."63 The communal divide has for over a 
century shaped everything; nothing in that time has re-shaped the communal divide. In this 
effectively static interpretation, explains Bourke, "antagonistic communities preserve their 
group integrity as they seamlessly progress through history, transmitting their hostility down 
the generations."64 Polarization for Wilson acts as a protective bubble. But, of course, the 
concept cannot take the pressure that this places upon it: the bubble bursts. This leaves 
Wilson violating the basic constructivist assumption that identities can change as a result of 
historical developments. 
In Wilson's static society, space stays the same. It has to because the argument is built 
upon the political scientist Frank Wright's concept of the "ethnic frontier."65 These are, in his 
words, "places where the populations of citizens and natives were fairly evenly balanced." 
"Citizens" have ethnic ties to the dominant group in the metropolitan center; "natives" may or 
may not have ethnic ties to the majority population in a bordering state. Wright takes four of 
his cases from East Central Europe -- Bohemia and Prussian Poland -- where from the 1880s 
onwards contemporaries were using the term "language frontiers."66 Recent scholarship that 
draws upon Brubaker has shown that these were discursive rather physical spaces. "Far from 
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constituting sites of daily battles between nations," writes Pieter Judson, "so-called language 
frontiers were often populated by rural people who did not automatically translate division in 
language use into divisions of self-identification." Using a language was instead a functional 
question, and a range of both formal and informal institutions had been created to bridge the 
gap.67 Here were spaces in which people lived, worked, traded, socialized, and slept together 
-- regardless of what language they first spoke to their parents.68 Nationalist activists, in their 
struggle to make everyone else national, found themselves frustrated again and again by how 
people resisted being put into their categories. "On the language frontier," Czech nationalists 
complained in 1908, "we must not only fight with the Germans, but also with renegades and 
with Czech apathy and national indifference."69 These conflicts were contingent and political 
rather than as the natural outcome of underlying ethnic realities. The gradual expansion of the 
franchise in Imperial Austria had resulted in political movements competing with each other 
to mobilize ever more people. Nation building was in effect party building, and it required the 
same levels of commitment and patience.70 Neither identifications nor frontiers were stable 
and fixed. 
Wright's depiction of imperial space as fixed has been superseded, too. Undercutting 
the metropole-colony divide, Tony Ballantyne has argued that the British Empire should be 
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viewed as "a complex agglomeration of overlapping webs." Individual empire builders were 
constantly spinning new threads, often in response to old ones being broken or destroyed. 
Irishmen and -women, from all backgrounds, made up a sizeable proportion of those who 
took up the opportunities and on the risks presented by this dynamic environment.71 The 
movement of people, goods, and ideas around the empire was not only tying points in 
imperial space to London, it also was tying them directly together with each other.72 Irish 
economic, social, cultural, religious, and familial networks flowed through the whole empire 
rather than just to Britain and back. For Catholic Churches in the English-speaking world and 
Catholic missions in Africa and Asia, it was Dublin rather than London that was the central 
node in their spiritual network.73 Empire also shaped resistance to it. Nationalist and anti-
colonial actors sought each other out to share experiences, ideas, and resources.74 In this 
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networked space, identifications and places were more the unique and ever-changing comings 
together of many different trajectories than they were stable and bounded entities. 75 
Regional and transnational studies are two of the ways historians have been trying to 
jump over the shadow of the nation. This problem was created, in part, by the discipline 
itself: most historians had been nation builders in the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries. By contrast, from the 1940s onwards, historians believed their profession was 
waging what T. W. Moody called a "war against servitude to myth."76 However, Moody did 
not question that a people had a connection to its collective past; he was seeking to replace a 
fictitious version of that link with the real thing.77 Even after the discipline moved on to 
picking apart imagined communities and collective memories, most scholars still wrote as if 
peoples were the subjects and agents of European history.78 Nationalists, though, had built 
peoples as well as nations. While they insisted a "new" or "revived" nation came out of an 
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"old" people, activists were, in fact, developing both these concepts in conjunction.79 
Scholars have too often taken these political claims to common ancestry as evidence of real 
continuities across time.80 Wilson describes the "Catholic/Protestant confrontation" as taking 
"shape" in the seventeenth century and then displaying "extraordinary longevity."81 But, as 
Louis Cullen has demonstrated for the eighteenth century, the "abstract Irish 'catholic'" and 
the "abstract Irish 'protestant'" "did not exist."82 National -- if not nationalist -- readings of the 
past replace the overlapping webs traced by protean and shifting loyalties with non-political 
ethnic groups.83 
Brubaker warns against even treating ethnic groups as "things in the world": 
"substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed."84 According to this 
interpretation, when Wilson writes "it took until June 1922 for the Catholic community to 
accept that it could not sustain its side of the 'murder competition'," he is engaging in 
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reification.85 Ethnic groups may not be real or on-going entities, according to Brubaker, but 
ethnicity may be used to make situational communities. Indeed, given that "groupness" is 
variable and contingent, ethnicity is an event -- something that may or may not happen.86 
Elizabeth Gilmour, who lived in Ardoyne, displayed the Union flag from her house in the run 
up to the Orange parades of July 1969. However, she also acted as a guarantor for a family 
from a different faith who wanted to move into her street, was a frequent visitor to the 
parochial house, and entertained Catholic priests in her front room.87 Thinking about ethnicity 
as relational and dynamic leads on to questioning how useful the concept still is. Brubaker 
concludes that "we may end up not studying ethnicity at all."88 
Todd regards Brubaker's arguments as a "revolution" -- and her response is to mount a 
counter-revolution.89 While Ruane and Todd accept that ethnicity is a way of perceiving the 
world, they insist that "conceptual food" can fatten up this "thin category." In Ireland, 
religious, colonial, national, and other cultural and political institutions, practices, and beliefs 
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thickened and deepened an overarching ethnic division. The result was a "system of 
relationships" based on "cultural difference, power relations, and communal belonging"; each 
of these overlapped with and reinforced the others. Ruane and Todd trace the "moment of 
crystallization" to the end of the seventeenth century, when the "British Protestant minority" 
won their "definitive victory." The system provided strong inducements for actors to operate 
within its rules and not to step outside of them. These positive and negative feedback loops 
ensured that the system reproduced itself across time and absorbed external shocks such as 
"modernization, industrialization, and democratization." Elements were added and discarded 
over the centuries, yet the system kept the basic relations the same. Partition merely 
succeeded in limiting the system to the north east of the island. "[S]olidary, bonded, easily-
mobilized populations with intense communal identification" were "emergent properties of 
the system." The strength and resilience both of the "Catholic" and "Protestant" communities 
and of the conflict between them was due to "systematicity" rather than to specific properties 
of "ethnicity."90 The banners of the counter-revolution bear the motto: groups without 
ethnicity. 
Ruane and Todd once more reduce politics to spume on the wave of history and treat 
peoples as transhistorical entities. What is different about their model, however, is that their 
groups are products of an institutionalized system. In theory, this system could shape politics 
and ensure continuity. Ruane and Todd ground their arguments in the ideas of path 
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dependence and rational choice.91 Path dependency started out as a way of explaining the 
development and diffusion of technologies such as videocassette recorders. In the stretched 
version of path dependence, contingent events set into motion institutional patterns where 
increasing returns lead to equilibrium across history. But, the years from the Tudor conquest 
to the War of the Two Kings cannot at all fairly be seen as what the sociologist James 
Mahoney calls "a highly improbable concurrence of events."92 The huge changes brought 
about during this period are more likely to be what is shaping later actions and identifications 
than are the system's mechanisms of reproduction. There are cracks in the second foundation, 
too. Humans have evolved to be social animals, acting on a sense of fairness instead of 
pursuing self interest.93 Anyway, as Kahneman has shown, human rationality is bounded.94 
This path appears to be a dead end. 
 
Democracy, Equality, and Conflict 
How, then, should the Troubles be explained? This article argues that it centered on a 
political conflict -- one over competing visions of modern democracy. Such a claim may 
seem odd at first, given that democracy tends to be viewed today as the basis for peace within 
and between states. However, even briefly studying the historical context in which modern 
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democracy was developed and debated shows how the concept can create conflict. In 
Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes reasoned that a political covenant can only take the form of an 
agreement in which each individual member of the throng contracts with every other one to 
authorize a single man or an assembly to act in their name. The many of the multitude 
becomes one through the "Unity of the Representer"; they now own in common all its words 
and actions. The political covenant thus brings into being two artificial persons: the author 
(the state) and the actor (the sovereign).95 A century later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau embraced 
the Hobbesian notion of a unitary, absolute, and indivisible sovereign, while at the same time 
rejecting the idea that sovereignty could be represented. The "public person" formed by 
Rousseau's social contract is called "State when it is passive, Sovereign when active." The 
individual in this body politic is kept free from domination thanks to the rule of law, as 
"obedience to the law one has prescribed to one's self is freedom." For this to work, however, 
Rousseau had to imagine that his republic has a patriotic population of equal standing that 
shares the same morals; a separate government run by an elected aristocracy; a civil religion; 
and a set of fundamental laws put in place by a god-like "Lawgiver."96 In other words, he had 
to imagine the impossible. "I see no tolerable mean," he subsequently conceded, "between the 
most austere Democracy and the most perfect Hobbesism."97 
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Nonetheless, at the start of the French Revolution, Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès believed 
that there was indeed an answer to Rousseau's "great problem of Politics." The solution was 
to see representation as the basis for liberty rather a threat to it: freedom was to come through 
association, not autonomy. In a commercial society, the production and consumption of 
goods, services, and ideas are based upon individuals having things done for them by 
representative labor. Humans have political needs, too, which are the same for everyone and 
can be met only through singular means. They therefore come together in a single body with 
a common will as a "nation" -- a term used by Sieyès, for tactical reasons, as a synonym for 
"state." When a nation grows in population and territory to a certain point, the real common 
will necessarily gives way to the representative common will. This is the "constituting 
power" -- that is to say, the sovereign -- which has been entrusted by the nation with creating 
a constitution. In turn, the "constituted power," the government, represents both the nation as 
a whole and its many different members. Representation links the public functions of the 
nation to the non-political activities of individuals; it also guards the lives and goods of the 
nation's members against abuses of power.98 Five months after What Is the Third Estate? 
appeared, Sieyès and the other commoner deputies met without the first two orders, adopted 
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the name National Assembly, and swore an oath to sit until they had given France a new 
constitution.99 
By the close of the eighteenth century, then, what Bourke classes as the "constitutive 
elements" of modern democracy -- "popular sovereignty and representation, the idea of the 
people and the concept of the state" -- were already in place.100 So, too, were the 
controversies around which most modern political conflicts have centered. How should the 
fictional community of the state be imagined? What form should the representation of its 
sovereignty take? Both Hobbes and Sieyès had based the state/nation upon existing countries: 
composite monarchies whose borders had been shaped by military might, marriage, and 
maleficence. Since the state is the indirect sovereignty of the people and abstract 
representation is how that sovereignty is exercised, nothing other than politics is left to define 
the people. Such reasoning raises the problems of putting the political before the people and 
of promoting chance over choice. What were the people before the state was constructed? 
What will the people be after the state is dissolved? Are those individuals who are unhappy 
with where history has put the state's boundaries free to join together in pursuit of a state of 
their own choosing? Put simply, how should the people -- yet another abstract -- be 
imagined?101 
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In modern Ireland, these questions have produced a range of different answers over 
the years. For unionists, the United Kingdom is the state and the Crown-in-Parliament 
exercises sovereignty. Following the creation of Northern Ireland, unionists have tended to 
want the sovereign to devolve some public functions to the province. Nationalists claim that 
the Irish nation, understood as a cultural group, is the people: the Irish nation/people existed 
before the British state and thus has the right to secede from it to form a state of its own. 
Constitutional nationalists once campaigned to pool this sovereignty within a federal system. 
After partition, however, those in the North shifted their allegiance to an all-Ireland set up. 
Republicans aspire to establishing a state that is both wholly united and completely 
independent. The road they have been taking to the Irish Republic, though, keeps twisting 
around, branching off, and dividing them up. Physical-force republicans style themselves the 
provisional representatives of the people's will, holding its sovereignty in trust until such time 
as an all-Ireland vote elects a constituting power. Loyalists, during moments of insurrection, 
stretch democratic principles even further with their insistence that they know the will of the 
majority of the people.102 This elides the distinction between a democratic government -- 
selected on the basis of the majority principle -- and a state -- understood as a contract of all 
with all.103 Rejecting Hobbes and Sieyès altogether, revolutionary socialists hold that 
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humanity, which is to say, the workers of the world, needs to be free of both representation 
and the state.104 
The secondary elements of modern democracy -- notably, the franchise and political 
parties -- introduced further complications and generated more conflict. The questions of who 
could vote in elections and of who could sit in legislative assemblies led to politically-
organized sets of answers. Over the course of the 1820s, Daniel O'Connell's Catholic 
Association, which aimed at ending the Anglican monopoly on government, became what 
Richard English calls "the first truly popular, mass-democratic organization."105 At the end of 
the century, the demand for women's suffrage provided an issue around which feminist 
activists built political campaigns and networks.106 Extending the franchise beyond men of 
property changed the political system. The Second and Third Reform Acts, together with the 
advent of the secret ballot, made it possible for the Irish Parliamentary Party to return eight-
six MPs in the 1885 general election.107 But, this does not mean that, as Michael Walzer puts 
it, "bring[ing] the 'people' into political life" sees them "arrive...marching in tribal ranks."108 
Parties do not reflect pre-existing cultures or classes; instead, they claim to represent the 
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interests of their constituency. Yet again, representation is indirect: parties push their own 
constructions of those interests, often denying and excluding the ways in which individuals 
really view their wants and needs.109 Indeed, parties -- along with other organizations such as 
state agencies, Churches, labor unions, interest groups, and paramilitaries -- are the principal 
actors in the drama of modern politics.110 That said, people are not passive participants in this 
relationship, as they can seek to reform the parties which claim to speak for them or they can 
seek out another one of their own choosing. Moreover, parties themselves are made up of 
ambiguous relationships that are always in the process of being renegotiated.111 During the 
autumn of 1966, backbench Unionist MPs staged a somewhat successful revolt against the 
party leadership for taking away functions from local councils and for taking decisions in an 
authoritarian manner.112 
The concept of modern democracy not only generates conflicts, it can also work to 
turn them violent. Bourke argues that this "lethal potential" stems from democracy's "core 
value," equality.113 "The equality in question," he writes, "involves 'equal' participation in 
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rule, meaning a proportionate, but not an identical, share."114 Each individual assesses him- or 
herself against everyone else whom s/he encounters, striving to make the evaluation a 
favorable one and fearing that it may not be. The relentless human need to pursue status can 
be held in check by hierarchies. But, democracy, at least in principle, does away with 
political distinctions -- which, in turn, releases the egalitarian drive and gives rise to factional 
struggle. Bourke brands this "democratic vanity."115 The provenance of this analysis goes all 
the way back to Aristotle and Thucydides. It was this common intellectual heritage that 
Edmund Burke was tapping into when he predicted that erecting a regime of equality to 
govern over a commercial society would mean "There must be blood." Revolutionary France 
would succumb first to "civil war" and finally to the rule of "some popular general."116 
Recent research in the natural and social sciences supports this ancient wisdom about 
the dangers posed by democracy's core value. All the hunter-gatherer societies studied by 
anthropologists have been found to be egalitarian on the whole. Individuals still seek to raise 
their own status, but the rest of the community put back in his-or-her place anyone who tries 
to gain special treatment at the expense of others. Until some 10,000 years ago, when 
agriculture was invented, all the humans who had ever lived probably belonged to tribes that 
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practiced the "reverse dominance" identified by Christopher Boehm.117 The result is that the 
mind has evolved to register unfairness in human relations and to seek out justice. This 
inference system often wins out over effortful logical reasoning, giving rise to an emotional 
need to have such actions punished, even if it comes at a cost.118 To rework Gould slightly, a 
subjective appraisal that an informal social contract has been broken triggers most 
interpersonal violence. It is, to use the term coined by the biologist Robert Trivers, 
"moralistic aggression."119 The core value of democracy therefore places at the heart of 
modern politics the main mechanism for turning human relations violent. So, when efforts to 
bring about a particular vision of democracy are frustrated -- something which the difficulty 
of the questions posed by the concept makes nearly certain -- a self-righteous fury can be set 
loose. If this cannot by cooled by either the political system or the constitutional set up, one 
or more organizations may well seek to assert their view of equality through a direct act of 
"the people." "But," writes Bourke, "one rarely restores a democracy by means of revolution. 
More usually, one starts a civil war."120 
 
Conflicts and Violence in Belfast during the Summer and Autumn of 1969 
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On 7 June 1971, John McKeague began giving evidence in camera to the Scarman Tribunal, 
which was inquiring into the civil disturbances that had happened two years earlier. Leslie 
Scarman had cleared the court "so that Mr. McKeague cannot suffer any prejudice."121 
McKeague was happy to inflict his own prejudices upon the tribunal, referring from the start 
of his answers to "Taigs," "Papists," and "Popeheads" and reveling in the chance to recount 
his violent deeds. Nonetheless, throughout a series of cross-examinations, he kept insisting 
that his passionate words and actions were based on principles of allegiance. McKeague was 
striving to defend "the Crown and Constitution" to which most of the population was loyal. 
"The majority...always rules." However, "under the British Constitution," minorities still had 
"the same political and civic rights and duties." "[A] Jew can come into this country," he 
explained, "[and] he can practise his religion and beliefs and still accept the Crown and the 
Constitution." So, too, could "any political or religious organisation." McKeague also 
conceded "the right of people in Northern Ireland to campaign by peaceful methods for a 
change in its Constitutional establishment." He was not fighting "Nationalists" but rather 
"rebels" "who have been using any force whatsoever -- subversive -- towards the 
Constitution." McKeague's targets were essentially victims of ideological violence. 
Moreover, he was doing this as only "a very small part" of "the people." They had "arisen" to 
"shake the Stormont Government...into action that should have been taken."122 McKeague's 
use of religious slurs does not mean his behavior was an automatic emotional response; he 
was acting on the basis of legitimating conventions and denying that his opponents were 
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doing the same. His fanaticism, then, was nothing other than an assertion of democratic 
vanity. 
The protagonists in the conflict on the streets of Belfast during the summer and 
autumn of 1969 all had opposing claims to democratic legitimacy. On 8 August, Home 
Secretary Jim Callaghan warned the Stormont Cabinet that "the United Kingdom 
Government would have to demonstrate that it had final responsibility."123 A week later, 
Patrick Hillery, the Minister of External Affairs, paid a visit to Whitehall to press the Irish 
Government's case for "your troops and ours [to] be combined together to form a peace-
keeping force" and for "a constitutional conference." He "did not accept that the North was an 
internal matter for the United Kingdom": "Northern Ireland is part of Ireland."124 The leaders 
of the Unionist Party pushed back against what they saw in both cases as unwarranted 
interventions in their affairs. At a press conference on 17 August, Prime Minister James 
Chichester-Clark pointed out that his government had "a parliamentary majority elected on 
'one man, one vote'". He urged that the "will" of the "sovereign authority of Westminster" had 
to be balanced against that of "a majority of Ulster people." As for Dublin, Chichester-Clark 
compared its "deplorable" behavior to "those hooligans who have used the present troubles as 
an excuse to burn their neighbours out." This had worked to "inflame opinion," inspiring the 
"political Opposition," who were against "the very existence of the State," to turn parliament 
into a "mere forum for wrangling." Of even greater concern was how this "very squalid 
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business" had aided "the activities of extreme Republican elements."125 The IRA Chief of 
Staff portrayed the use of its "all too limited resources" as having been "an attempt to hold off 
the terrorist forces of reaction." These "legitimate" actions had been carried out by "the 
provisional government of the Irish Republic."126 
Due to an upsurge in grassroots organizing, the main actors found themselves joined 
on the political stage by a huge supporting cast. Local groups with a range of names -- action 
committees, peace committees, defence associations, and so on -- sprang up across Belfast, 
beginning in the west and north. Political activists were often involved, yet they were rarely 
in control. Although Republicans had helped to create the Ardoyne Citizens' Action 
Committee in late May 1969, a crowd of locals soon afterwards confronted them and forced 
them to quit.127 By the time the British army was committed, soldiers were marching into "a 
complicated and ever-shifting maze of street politics."128 To a certain extent, as Sieyès had 
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once feared happening to France, Belfast was breaking up into little republics.129 The 
Ballymacarrett Citizens' Defence Committee sent representatives to negotiate with the 
authorities about "matters affecting the people." After a deal was reached, it "was presented 
to a meeting" and "was approved unanimously."130 Across the river, a number of groups were 
brought together by Jim Sullivan, the Belfast IRA's second in command, in the Central 
Citizens' Defence Committee (CCDC).131 Republicans, however, could not control this 
umbrella body anymore than they could the Ardoyne Citizens' Action Committee. Balancing 
them out was a Church faction, which the hierarchy closely supervised. The CCDC was so 
split that its members frequently allied themselves with a range of outsiders in their attempts 
to get their way.132 Important decisions, such as whether to put up or to take down barricades, 
had to be made independently by local committees.133 On the Shankill Road, there was not 
even the appearance of unity, with factions openly contesting each other's claim to speak for 
"the people." McKeague's Shankill Defence Association (SDA) competed with, among 
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others, Ian Paisley, a Unionist-led peace committee, the Workers Committee for the Defence 
of the Constitution, and a group of "mothers."134 
Organizations -- old and new, big and small -- mobilized people, provided them with 
the chance to participate, and coordinated their actions. The SDA elected officers, took 
membership subscriptions, and held weekly meetings. Army intelligence "suspect[ed]" that 
most SDA members were "self-styled 'leaders' of their areas" and noted how they 
"represented" the "views and complaints" of those neighborhoods.135 On the streets, 
McKeague and his "Headquarters party" directed attacks by giving orders to a team of 
lieutenants and by addressing crowds over loudhailers.136 Militant organizations also 
exercised command and control over the airwaves. The morning after 39 Infantry Brigade 
deployed, an armored car picked up on its radio IRA communications.137 The following 
month, the pirate station Radio Orange asked its listeners to carry transistor radios so that it 
could send them to where clashes were taking place.138 After Radio Free Belfast was jammed, 
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Republicans adapted by putting up along the Falls Road posters that urged people to 
"reinforce their barricades."139 Riots, as a military analysis concluded, were produced by a 
"militant, extremist leadership."140 
By the middle of September 1969, the general officer commanding, the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) Special Branch, and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had all 
agreed that the SDA and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) were most likely to be the authors 
of the next "major" disorder.141 During early October, reports came in that both organizations 
were indeed planning multiple demonstrations to stretch the security forces and that Loyalists 
had smuggled a cache of arms in from Sweden. The pretexts for taking to the streets were 
rumored to be the use of CS gas, McKeague's arrest, and soldiers fraternizing with local 
women. Finally, on the night of 10/11 October, Special Branch received solid intelligence 
that the Loyalist plan to "confront" the military was about to be put into action. Starting with 
women and children sitting down in the way of lunchtime traffic, the sequence of protests 
kept closely to the timetable acquired by Special Branch ("Next performance scheduled for 
1800"). As the day got darker, the RUC struggled to shield Unity Flats -- seen by Loyalists as 
an IRA citadel -- from a crowd of around 2,000 men. With the pubs letting out Saturday-night 
drinkers, the police called in the army. Missiles were met with CS gas, smoke drew gunfire 
and petrol bombs, and automatic weapons were countered with armored vehicles. The battle 
between British soldiers and suspected ex-servicemen went on until dawn, by which time 
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Loyalists had let loose in excess of 1,000 rounds. Following up their advantage, the security 
forces carried out a search operation later that morning. It captured "two petrol bomb 
factories, a small supply of arms and ammunition, and equipment and literature belonging to 
Radio Loyal Ulster."142 
"Events," judged the 39 Infantry Brigade INTSUM, "had been pre-planned."143 The 
scholarly consensus, however, is that the protests and violent acts were largely spontaneous: 
an emotional reaction from "Protestant Belfast" to the publication of the Hunt Report on 
policing, not least its proposal to do away with the Special Constabulary.144 This distorted 
view is the result of inadvertently looking at developments through a national or ethnic 
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optic.145 Historians have to work with the traces of the past that survive into the present and 
activists have worked hard to construct narratives that endure. Writing about Imperial 
Austria, Judson shows how nationalist politicians and journalists kept recasting incidents that 
were "structured, limited, and planned" as evidence of "widespread" and "enduring" 
"nationalist frustration." The logic of this interpretation, then, was that different communities 
had to be kept apart or they would tear each other apart -- and it was "so flawless that most 
historians have agreed with it."146 Much the same has happened in modern Irish 
historiography. Loyalist weakness at the start of the Troubles has thus been mistaken for 
strength. The Shankill's self-proclaimed defenders for their own partisan purposes had chosen 
to bring the war home to an area that was "relatively peaceful." They were producing 
violence to build support. Other people certainly did join the SDA and UVF to confront the 
security forces, but they were mostly drunks, petty criminals, and curious onlookers, who 
drifted away when the gunmen began to use them as human shields.147 As for the young 
women whose honor the Loyalists were guarding, "girls returning home from a dance" told 
reporters "they would have to spend the night in the street."148 The relationship between 
Loyalist organizations and the individuals they claimed to represent was at best ambiguous 
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and at worst abusive and absurd. It was the same with Republicans: in Ballymurphy, for 
instance, the IRA intimidated locals who owned licensed firearms into handing the guns over 
to "their" defenders.149 
The writer Hugh Shearman noted how "modern inventions" were making the street 
fighting very different from that which he had witnessed in the 1920s. He picked out as 
examples "the materials for making petrol bombs" and the transistor radios "for rallying 
support for a riot."150 The movement of people, goods, and ideas was, as usual, driving 
change. But, by the late 1960s, Belfast had been integrated into a different "Market Empire": 
the web of networks traced by America's power and influence in the world. A conveyor belt 
of innovative products, Washington's championing of free trade, and the dynamic marketing 
campaigns of American firms enmeshed Western Europe in consumer-oriented capitalism.151 
The global vectors that came together as they passed through the local terrain of Belfast not 
only created new street-fighting techniques, they also created new spaces for the fighting and 
new identifications for those on the streets. Tower blocks, housing estates, motorways, 
airwaves, nightclubs, and an expanded university became sites of conflict. Moving from 
place to place and hanging out in specific spots across this urban landscape were teenagers: 
young people who, through consumption, had imagined themselves into a global youth 
culture. Young women wore miniskirts on both the Falls Road and the Shankill Road and 
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Belfast had grown its own beat-music scene.152 New fashions, music, and lifestyles offered 
ways of engaging in self-invention; democracy's egalitarian drive led individuals in a variety 
of sub-cultures to struggle for the freedom to be their authentic selves.153 
During the summer of 1969, Fr Marcellus Gillespie, who liked to wear black jeans 
and a leather jerkin, tried to harness youth culture to counter the activities of Republicans and 
Loyalists. On 2 August, Gillespie -- along with two nightclub promoters, a music journalist, 
and a Labour politician -- staged the free "Pop for Peace" festival for a crowd of at least 5,000 
in parkland ringing the city. John Lennon and Yoko Ono sent a telegram from their Montreal 
bed-in ("All we are saying is give peace a chance."), BBC Radio 1 lent support, and the chart-
topping Marmalade headlined the event. More teenagers danced at Pop for Peace that 
afternoon than rioted in west and north Belfast that night. SDA members were the prime 
movers in this violence and the organization had earlier tried to intimidate the National Trust 
into backing out of hosting the festival. For Loyalists, Pop for Peace was not just a threat to 
their street politics, it was also part of a plot orchestrated by Lennon and Moscow to 
overthrow Stormont.154 
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While this was fanciful, leftists -- who were themselves more of a scene than an 
organization or movement -- did indeed have hopes that youth culture could work as a bridge 
to political involvement. The newssheets and radio programs they produced from behind the 
barricades of Free Belfast drew upon the words, sounds, and images of the international 
counterculture. A satirical attack on two Special Branch officers, for instance, ended with 
"the boys in Hooker Street" asking to hear "Gratefully Dead" by the psychedelic-rock band 
Eric Burdon and The Animals.155 Leftists attempted to argue that political concerns, too, had 
become transnational. "The human rights we are seeking are the rights people all over the 
world are entitled to," declared the Citizen Press, "whether he be the negro in America [or] 
the Czech in the face of Russian Imperialism."156 
Connections, concrete and imagined, could cause understandings of space to expand 
to encompass the globe, but they could also lead them to shrink down to a single street. "We 
were born and raised with each other up here," said one interviewee in an article on The Bone 
and Louisa Street from early August 1969, "it's like a family."157 West and north Belfast was 
made up of many such spaces. Shopkeepers, publicans, and bookmakers lived together with 
workers and in some districts, including The Bone and Louisa Street, so, too, did people of 
different Christian denominations. Religious divisions did not in and of themselves produce 
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conflict. A woman, whose husband was both an engineer and a B Special, gave evidence to 
the Scarman Tribunal that she would go to the launderette on Clonard Gardens off the Falls 
Road every Monday and have "fine good times" "gossiping" with her "Roman Catholic 
neighbours."158 Further north, on a small street close to the Shankill Road, a Roman Catholic 
mother told an interviewer from the United States that her "Protestant neighbors" were "good 
women" and that her daughters "play[ed] with Protestants."159 In Ardoyne, older children and 
teenagers mixed socially at an interdenominational youth club.160 While a lot more research 
remains to be done here, the evidence does suggest that these were situational communities 
based on place rather than class or religious identifications. For a Roman Catholic man from 
Leopold Street who worked and drank with Protestant from the Shankill, Orange parades 
were just "a seasonal thing, it was like water going off a duck." His family's everyday life 
was usually "happy." 161 The members of these communities looked out for each other, 
sharing the struggle against the common threats of poverty and insecurity. A woman from 
Hooker Street recalled at the Scarman Tribunal how her family cared for a sick man who 
lived a few doors down and took in a girl when her mother worked weekends -- even though 
both these people subscribed to a different faith from her family.162 Formal institutions may 
have been organized on a denominational basis, but informal institutions could cross the 
religious divide. Like residents of northern England's industrial towns and London's deprived 
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districts, most of those who dwelled in Belfast's communities of place saw the urban 
landscape as functional and constraining. They did not separate out the social and cultural 
from the spatial nor see individuals as social and cultural products.163 
The "ordinary" people of such places did not turn on each other during the summer 
and autumn of 1969 -- at least, not at first.164 In The Bone and Louisa Street, men from a 
range of backgrounds volunteered for a "lay security force"165 Sandy Row's peace committee 
"collaborated well" with its counterpart in the abutting Markets district and both "worked 
together" to keep order.166 In the Docks area, an action committee made up of Roman 
Catholics and Protestants took responsibility for "patrolling the streets," where "neighbours 
are still on the most-friendly terms." Belfast's "peace corps" were set up to try to shield their 
communities against the attacks coming from outside by political activists.167 A mixed group 
of vigilantes stopped vehicles travelling along Ardoyne's Alliance Avenue because, its 
spokesman explained, "We don't want any guns taken into our area."168 
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"I don't fear a mob," said "Paddy" to the Belfast Telegraph in early August, "But 
when they have meetings and walk up the street making a list of houses to be cleared, it is 
different." His "heartbroken" "Protestant neighbours" had tried to help the family, but they, 
too, were "threatened."169 McKeague almost certainly burned Elizabeth Gilmour out of her 
house in Ardoyne, so he could blame "rebels" for the outrage and justify taking reprisals.170 
(One of her Roman Catholic neighbors secured her damaged property to keep out looters.)171 
Republicans were also menacing some of the people they had vowed to defend. During early 
August, an IRA-front organization advised a number of families on Hooker Street to leave for 
their own safety and provided a truck for them to move their furniture. Soon afterwards, 
many of these families returned to their homes.172 A Roman Catholic widower who did not 
want to leave the house in the Shankill he had lived in "for most of his 71 years" had his 
windows boarded up by three local men ("I believe in the text 'Love thy neighbour'").173 
Groupness events usually involved neighbors coming together to support each other; different 
communities were not in conflict. 
Across the river in east Belfast, where the fighting of the 1920s had begun, this 
pattern was much more pronounced. On 19 August, the Guardian's Simon Hoggart found 
Roman Catholics and Protestants "visiting each other, exchanging news and cups of tea." 
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Hoggart credited the East Belfast Peace Committee with keeping these "friendship[s] 
warm."174 This self-styled "army of moderation" drew its 300-or-so volunteers from, in the 
words of one of them, "all classes, all denominations, old people and young people, and all 
political opinions." It put on nightly street patrols, organized a drop-in center, ran a 24-hour 
telephone help line, produced a bulletin to counter rumors, and collected 12,000 signatures 
for a "peace petition." The chair of the committee had strong links to the shipyard trade 
unions, which were encouraging their members to continue to get along with each other 
inside as well as outside work.175 At a meeting called by the shop stewards on 15 August, 
thousands of workers passed a resolution expressing their "determination to maintain peace 
and good will."176 The police officer in charge of the area praised the trade unions at the 
Scarman Tribunal for ensuring there was "no violence of any kind between opposing factions 
or individuals in the shipyard."177 
As the situation continued to deteriorate in north and west Belfast, however, acts of 
resistance gave way to making the movement of people more orderly and less violent. 
Committees backed by clergymen from a range of denominations oversaw exchanges of 
houses and ministers opened up their churches and halls to provide shelter for those with 
nowhere to go. Neighbors watched over the property left behind and helped redecorate new 
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homes.178 In Dover Street, next to the Shankill Road, the leader of the local vigilantes, a 
grocer, blocked squatters from taking over the furnished Cunningham house so as to give his 
regular customers the chance to return. Lily MacNeill, who had "Protestant in her own 
family," did return to her home in nearby Ardmoulin Avenue -- but, she told an American 
reporter, "I don't see how I can stay."179 Violence had broken up neighborhoods. On 19 
August, "an Ardoyne resident" "took a long walk through the district where [he] was born 
and reared" and "got the impression many friendships have been lost."180 
Belfast's neighborhoods were like families -- and like families they had their conflicts. 
On the streets of the city, both the pursuit of status and the scrutiny of behavior were open, 
daily, and intense.181 This produced conflicts, which sometimes became violent. The 
Troubles greatly increased the likelihood of intimate violence, as the disruption made it more 
difficult for individuals to coordinate their understandings of the world with each other. 
Efforts to address the problem through gossip only served to undermine civic cohesion even 
further.182 Rumors scared people into fleeing their areas, deceived them into supporting the 
stratagems of militant organizations, led them to suspect public services, and made them 
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distrust information provided by the media and the authorities. 39 Infantry Brigade started 
running an internal "Rumour of the week" competition; the winning story one week was that 
Loyalists were tunneling under Unity Flats.183 
Individuals who experienced moralistic aggression could choose to take direct action 
against their targets. With some people believing local communities needed to police 
themselves, outsiders -- especially alleged child abusers -- received verbal threats and 
physical assaults. Intimate violence arising out of seemingly trivial matters was much more 
common.184 A man feuding with his neighbors in the Shankill set his dog on the couple and a 
dispute over car parking in Clonard led to a threat of slashed tires. Tensions within one 
family living in Ardoyne turned violent when a man set fire to his mother-in-law's clothes. 
The connections between intimate violence and the overarching conflict could be direct, too. 
Vigilante patrols sometimes quarreled among themselves and these rows could escalate 
quickly from exchanging insults through trading punches to firing bullets.185 By far the most 
popular way of trying to put someone back in their place, though, was to use the 
communication networks provided by state agencies. "The spate of threatening telephone 
calls and letters," recorded the 39 Infantry Brigade INTSUM for the start of September 1969, 
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"now embraces the whole of Belfast."186 Every neighborhood in the city, regardless of its 
religious or class makeup, was conflictual; however, only those districts where the British 
army and paramilitary groups were present had serious incidents of interpersonal violence. 
This was because moralistic aggression could be expressed indirectly here. Pirate radio 
stations delivered numerous threats to named individuals over the airwaves.187 The army 
received tip offs from the public that sent soldiers across west and north Belfast on raids -- 
the usual result of which was simply a terrorized household.188 
The politicization of private life and the privatization of politics had the heaviest 
impact upon young women.189 That so many people came to believe the rumor that the army 
had set up "courting facilities in troubled areas of the city" was a reflection of how strong the 
sense of sexual threat was.190 These concerns were not entirely exaggerated; a few soldiers 
did prey upon underage girls.191 Nonetheless, some individuals were using claims to be 
defending virtue to justify dealing out violence. Over the course of autumn 1969, two 
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teenagers with boyfriends in the army had their hair cut off -- one had it done to her by her 
own mother and attempted suicide afterwards.192 The Troubles handed domestic abusers 
excuses and weapons: this was what a judge ruled in the case of a man who had hurled a 
petrol bomb at his long-term girlfriend's home (he missed and set fire to another house).193 
However, the Troubles also offered women in violent relationships ways of fighting back, as 
they could now enlist soldiers into their service. The army was called upon to get property 
back from an ex-boyfriend, to evict a man just out of prison who had kicked in the door to his 
wife's house, and to "keep an eye" on an abusive husband. Exploiting the premium on 
information, one woman telephoned in a tip off that her IRA boyfriend kept guns at home and 
had robbed a Dublin bank.194 
The blending of public and private was at play in the activities of paramilitaries, too. 
Individual state agents were typically targeted for personal reasons as well as for the uniform 
they wore. Ex-prisoners with long memories stabbed a retired guard, the SDA sought revenge 
on a corporal who had struck Loyalists with his rifle butt, and the army had to rescue a 
"despised" RUC man before he was shot on the Falls.195 Pubs were attacked by militants 
because they were the headquarters for rival groups; they were also selected because they 
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were business competitors and stocked with liquor to loot.196 In the neighborhoods that 
militant organizations were seeking to control, claims on money and goods came with the 
claimed protection. East Belfast shopkeepers had to "subscribe to the vigilantes' tea fund" and 
residents of the Falls had to provide packs of cigarettes.197 While some were taking, however, 
others were giving back: Sullivan returned lots of stolen goods, including a sub-machine gun 
belonging to the Royal Hampshire Regiment.198 The mixture of motives held by paramilitary 
members was different for each individual and they varied across both time and space. What 
appears to have been common to most people in most moments, though, was the pride taken 
in participating with others in a struggle against great injustice. Processes mattered more than 
outcomes.199 There were no rational, self-interested actors in the militant organizations 
fighting in Belfast. 
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The first British soldier shot dead during the Troubles does not appear in Lost Lives; 
Craftsman Christopher Edgar is absent from the book because he chose to kill himself.200 
Before his suicide on 14 September 1969, Edgar had written home that the tour had left him 
feeling "like a zombie."201 Six weeks later, another soldier with depression had a psychotic 
episode. He climbed on to the roof of Albert Street mill, took off his uniform, and fired his 
rifle towards the Lower Falls. Thanks to Sullivan's co-operation, the army was able to contain 
the situation and convince the soldier to leave the roof without anyone getting hurt.202 
Internal conflicts such as the ones endured by these two men disrupted emotional regulation; 
this, in turn, made aggression and violence much more likely.203 Troubled minds played a 
part in producing the violence of the Troubles and the violence of the Troubles played a part 
in producing troubled minds. As early as the end of August, family doctors were already 
"flooded" with patients suffering from depression, anxiety, and dissociative disorders. 
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Another familiar way of coping with hidden harm -- teenage firesetting -- became a problem 
the following month. 204 
The Troubles, even in its first year, was a constellation of conflicts. Some were 
confined within a single head, others stretched across the globe; some were lonely struggles, 
others affected millions of people; some were over in minutes, others lasted decades. These 
multiple dynamic and intersecting conflicts were arrayed around a central conflict, the one 
over rival conceptions of democracy. It was when this conflict turned violent -- a difference 
in kind, not of degree -- that violence started to be deployed much more in other conflicts, 
too. Civil war broke buildings, bodies, and brains. But, the violence of the Troubles was 
creative as well as destructive: individuals and organizations responded to it by constructing 
new identifications, institutions, and ideas. These processes had logics of their own, giving 
rise over time to conflicts that were barely connected to those charted in this section. The 
original issue in contention, however, was not marginalized. Indeed, the conflict over the 
meaning of popular sovereignty has continued to structure public life into the peace-process 
era. 
 
Conclusion 
The M1 motorway was carved through west Belfast at the end of the 1950s and the start of 
the 1960s. Its planners had set out to make travelling to and from the center quick and easy. 
In a similar fashion, ethnic readings of the Troubles have promised a simple way to cover a 
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lot of ground in a short space of time.205 When moving at such speeds, the complex 
interactions of the local and the transnational, the individual and the collective, and the 
personal and the political going on in the surrounding streets blurs into just one conflict. It 
looks as if whole communities have been struggling for mastery. Residents of west Belfast 
had been largely powerless to stop the M1 getting built, but stopping the traffic now gave 
them some power. From the summer of 1969 onwards, sit-down protests and barricades 
regularly closed down motorway junctions.206 This article, likewise, is an attempt to disrupt 
the smooth flow of the ethnicity freeway. Slowing scholars down gives them the chance to 
look more closely at what happened in the city's neighborhoods. And once the complicated 
patterns have been spotted amid the rows of houses and blocks of flats those who find them, 
hopefully, will not be blind to them again. 
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